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Abstract
We present comparative probabilistic analysis of the Greenburger-
Horne-Zeilinger paradox in the frameworks of Kolmogorov’s (measure-
theoretical) and von Mises’ (frequency) models of the probability the-
ory. This analysis demonstrated that the GHZ paradox is merely a
consequence of the use of Kolmogorov’s probabilistic model. By using
von Mises’ frequency approach we escape the contradiction between
the local realism and quantum formalism. The frequency approach im-
plies automatically contextual interpretation of quantum formalism:
different collectives induce different probability distributions. On the
other hand, the formal use of Kolmogorov’s model implies the identifi-
cation of such distributions with one abstract Kolmogorov measure. In
the measure-theoretical approach we can escape the paradox, if we do
not suppose that probability distributions corresponding to different
settings of measurement devices are equivalent. We discuss the con-
nection between equivalence/singularity dichotomy in measure theory
and the existence of compatible and noncompatible observables.
1 Introduction
It is well known that violations of Bell’s inequality [1] by quantum correla-
tions in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) framework may be interpreted
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as the evidence of the impossibility to use the local realism in quantum the-
ory (see, for example, [2], [3]). Such a viewpoint was strongly supported
by experiments of Aspect [2] which demonstrated violations of generalized
Bell’s inequality (see also [3]). Despite of the general attitude to connect
violations of Bell’s inequality with such problems as determinism and local-
ity, there exists sufficiently strong opposition [4]-[9] to such a conclusion.
This opposition, despite of the great diversity of approaches, can be called
the probability opposition. The general viewpoint of adherents of the proba-
bilistic interpretation of violations of Bell’s inequality is that the derivation
of this inequality is based on numerous (hidden) probabilistic assumptions.
Unfortunately at the present time there are no experimental facts which can
justify these probabilistic assumptions. It seems that theoretical as well as
experimental investigations of the EPR paradox (in particular, Bell’s inequal-
ity) must be at least partly reoriented to the investigation of probabilistic
roots of this paradox.
The viewpoint that the notion of probability plays the large role in Bell’s
(and in EPR’s) considerations is not so new, [4]-[9]. The main consequence
of all these probabilistic analyses is that the EPR experiment could not be
described (as it was assumed by J. Bell, [1]) by the unique Kolmogorov prob-
ability distribution. In fact, these are various forms of contextual interpre-
tation of quantum formalism): (1) De Broglie, Lochak, Nelson, De Muynck,
De Baere, Marten, Stekelenborg, [4], thermodynamical approach to Bell’s
problem, difference between hidden and observed probabilities; (2) Beltram-
etti and Cassinelli [5], quantum logic; (3) Accardi [6], quantum probabilities,
no Bayes’ formula; (4) Pitowsky and Gudder [7], probability manifolds; (5)
De Baere [7], fluctuating probabilities; (6) Fine and Rastal [7], no simultane-
ous probability distribution; (7) Muckenheim [7], negative probabilities; (8)
Khrennikov [8], p-adic probabilities; fluctuating probabilities and modified
Bell’s inequality [9].
However, a new strong argument in the favour of nonlocal (or nonreal)
interpretation of the EPR paradox [10] was given by so called Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) paradox, [11]. The GHZ scheme is based on the
probability one arguments. From the first point of view all probabilistic cir-
cumstances of the GHZ scheme are so straightforward that there is no more
place for probabilistic counter arguments. However, the careful probabilis-
tic analysis demonstrates that the GHZ paradox has even deeper connection
to foundations of probability theory than Bell’s inequality. Roughly speak-
ing the root of the GHZ paradox might be in the use of the conventional
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probability calculus, namely Kolmogorov’s (axiomatic) measure theoretical
approach, 1933, [12].
In this paper we shall consider the GHZ paradox from the viewpoint of so
called frequency probability theory, R. von Mises, 1919 [13] (see [14] for the
advanced formalism). In the opposite to Kolmogorov’s model of probability
theory which is characterized by the highest degree of abstraction, von Mises’
model of probability theory is characterized by its concreteness. By R. von
Mises we cannot consider a probability distributions without the relation to
the concrete collective (random sequence). Von Mises’ slogan was: ”first
collective and then probability distribution”. Analysis of the GHZ paradox
based on von Mises’ approach demonstrated that it is rather doubtful that
there exists a collective which produces the probability distribution which
is formally (via Kolmogorov’s approach) used in the GHZ considerations.
Hence if we use a mathematical model of probability theory which is different
from Kolmogorov’s model, namely von Mises’ model, we observe no paradox
in the GHZ considerations. In particular, there is no contradiction between
the quantum formalism with the frequency interpretation of probability and
local realism.
Of course, our probabilistic considerations could not be considered as
arguments in favour of either locality or determinism. It may be that phys-
ical reality is nonlocal or even nonreal. However, Bell’s as well as GHZ’s
approaches do not give definite arguments to deny locality or determinism.
Both these approaches are strongly based on the use of one particular model
of probability theory, Kolmogorov’s model.
Our frequency analysis clarifies the measure-theoretical roots of the GHZ
paradox. In fact, this paradox can be escaped even in the measure-theoretical
approach if it would not be assumed that probability distributions corre-
sponding to different settings of measurement devices are equivalent mea-
sures. We discuss the connection between equivalence/singularity dichotomy
in measure theory and the existence of compatible and noncompatible observ-
ables. It seems that the splitting of physical reality to classical and quantum
realities is just a consequence of the general (mathematical) property of prob-
ability measures. So it is just a property of our (mathematical) description
of physical reality.
The Kolmogorov definition of a probability space is well known [12], [15].
This is a triple (Ω, F,P), where Ω is an abstract set, F is a σ-field of subsets
(events) of Ω,P is the probability (normalized by 1 and σ-additive) measure
on F. On the other hand, the frequency probability theory of R. von Mises is
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now days practically forgotten. So we must present an extended introduction
to this approach, see section 2.
We must remark that von Mises’ theory was strongly criticized due to
rather informal definition of randomness, [16]. In fact, this purely mathe-
matical critique was one of the reasons to eliminate the frequency approach
from quantum formalism. We do not relate our use of frequency theory to so-
phisticated mathematical problems of randomness [16]. There are two main
reasons to eliminate the problem of randomness from physical considerations
and justify the use of the frequency formalism. The first is von Mises’ ob-
servation that the class of place selections must be determined not by some
mathematical theory, but by the concrete physical phenomenon. This view-
point is supported by Wald’s theorem [17] by that if we fix a countable set
of place selections, then there exist sufficiently many collectives with respect
to this set of place selections. The second is my own observation that it
seems to be that the property of randomness is not related (at least directly)
to physical measurements (at least for present experiments). We are always
interested only in one property of a sequence of observations: the statistical
stabilization of relative frequencies νN =
n
N
to some limiting quantities P
(probabilities).
2 Frequency probability theory
2.1. History. The frequency probability theory was developed by R. von Mises
in 1919 (see [13], [14], [9] for the details). In fact, the basis of the frequency ap-
proach was provided in the work of J. Venn, 1866, see [18]. The frequency theory
was used as the motivation of Kolmogorov’s axiomatic, 1933, of the conventional
probability theory (see remarks in [12]). The main advantage of the conventional
theory is its abstractness. Here we work with abstract probability distributions
which are not directly related to the concrete physical model. Thus results of
the conventional probability theory can be used without any modification in any
physical models. However, this advantage may become in some circumstances a
disadvantage, because the abstractness of the formalism does not give the possi-
bility to analyse the origin (and even the existence) of probability distributions.
On the other hand, the frequency theory of probability is concrete. Here to in-
troduce a probability distribution, we must be sure that there exists a collective
(random sequence) which produces this probability distribution. The collective is
more primary object than a probability distribution. The collective has more di-
rect connection with a physical phenomenon. However, in the frequency approach
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we cannot obtain results which are valid for ‘all probability distributions’. The
probability distribution without a collective is nothing. Typically such a concrete-
ness is considered as the large disadvantage of the frequency approach (comparing
with the conventional measure theoretical approach). Of course, it is more attrac-
tive to prove some probabilistic statement ones and then to apply it to numerous
physical models. This was one of the reasons to eliminate the frequency approach
from applications in the favour of the measure-theoretical approach. 1
In the present paper we demonstrate that the frequency analysis of probabilistic
assumptions for the derivation of Bell’s inequality can give some new sights to
this problem. These sights would be impossible to obtain in the conventional
abstract framework. Analysis of collectives can give more than analysis of abstract
probability distributions.
2.2. Collective. Let E be an ensemble of physical systems. We take
elements of E and form a sequence pi = (pi1, pi2, ..., piN , ...) . Suppose that
elements of E have some properties. 2 Suppose that these properties can
be described by natural numbers, L = {1, 2, ..., m} (the set of ‘labels’). In
principle we can consider continuous label sets, see [14]. Thus, for each
pij ∈ pi, we have a number αj ∈ L. So pi induces a sequence
x = (α1, α2, ..., αN , ...), αj ∈ L. (1)
For each fixed α ∈ L, we have the relative frequency νN (α) = nN(α)/N of
the appearance of α in (α1, α2, ..., αN).
R. von Mises said that x satisfies to the principle of the statistical stabi-
lization of relative frequencies, if, for each fixed α ∈ L, |νN(α) − νM(α)| →
0, N,M →∞. The corresponding limit
p(α) = lim
N→∞
νN (α) (2)
is said to be a probability. This probability can be extended to the field of
all subsets of L :
p(B) = lim
N→∞
νN(α ∈ B) = lim
N→∞
∑
α∈B
νN(α) =
∑
α∈B
p(α) , B ⊂ L (3)
(the situation becomes sufficiently complex for an infinite L, see Tornier [11]).
We remark that p(L) = 1.
1Another reason was the problem of the rigorous mathematical definition of a collective,
random sequence, see, for example, [9].
2It is not important in general either these properties are objective (properties of an
object) or ‘created’ in the process of observation by an observer, see [3].
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R. von Mises said that x satisfies the principle of randomness if limits
(2) are invariant with respect to choices of some subsequences in x. These
choices of subsequences, so called place selections, have some properties, see
[13], [14] or [9] (which are unimportant for our investigation). 3 In principle
the reader may forget about the principle of randomness and consider only
the principle of the statistical stabilization. It seems that only this principle
is important (at least at the moment) in physics in that we study behaviour
of frequencies.
Sequence (1) which satisfies to two von Mises’ principles is said to be a
collective; p is said to be a probability distribution of the collective x.We will
often use the symbols p(B; x) (and νN(B; x), nN (B; x)), B ⊂ L, to indicate
the dependence on the concrete collective x.
The frequency probability formalism is not a calculus of probabilities. It
is a calculus of collectives. Thus instead of operations for probabilities (as it
is in the conventional probability theory), we define operations for collectives.
2.3. Operation of combining of collectives. This operation will
play the crucial role in our analysis of probabilistic foundations of Bell’s
arguments. Let x = (xj) and y = (yj) be two collectives with label sets Lx
and Ly, respectively. We define a new sequence z = (zj), zj = {xj , yj} (in
general z is not a collective). Let a ∈ Lx and b ∈ Ly. Among the first N
elements of z there are nN(a; z) elements with the first component equal to a.
As nN(a; z) = nN(a; x) is a number of xj = a among the first N elements of
x, we obtain that limN→∞
nN (a;z)
N
= p(a; x). Among these nN(a; z) elements,
there are a number, say nN (b/a; z) whose second component is equal to b.
The frequency νN(a, b; z) of elements of the sequence z labeled (a, b) will then
be
nN (b/a; z)
N
=
nN(b/a; z)
nN (a; z)
nN (a; z)
N
.
We set νN (b/a; z) =
nN (b/a;z)
nN (a;z)
. Let us assume that, for each a ∈ Lx, the
subsequence y(a) of y which is obtained by choosing yj such that xj = a is
an collective. Then, for each a ∈ Lx, b ∈ Ly, there exists
p(b/a; z) = lim
N→∞
νN(b/a; z) = lim
N→∞
νN (b; y(a)) = p(b; y(a)). (4)
3The class of place selections was not defined precisely by R. von Mises. This induced
numerous discussions. However, the problem can be solved (at least partially) by the
consideration of countable classes of place selections, Wald theorem, [17] or [9], p.43.
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We have
∑
b∈L2 p(b/a; z) = 1. The existence of p(b/a; z) implies the existence
of p(a, b; z) = limN→∞ νN(a, b; z). Moreover, we have
p(a, b; z) = p(a; x) p(b/a; z) (5)
and p(b/a; z) = p(a, b; z)/p(a; x), if p(a; x) 6= 0. We have
∑
a∈La
∑
b∈L2
p(a, b; z) = 1.
Thus in this case the sequence z is an collective and the probability distri-
bution p(a, b; z) well defined. The collective y is said to be combinable with
the collective x. The relation of combining is a symmetric relation on the set
of pairs of collectives with strictly positive probability distributions (p > 0).
2.4. Independent collectives. Let x and y be collectives. Suppose that
they are combinable. The y is said to be independent from x if all collectives
y(a), a ∈ Lx, have the same probability distribution which coincides with
the probability distribution p(b; y) of y. This implies that
p(b/a; z) = lim
N→∞
νN(b/a; z) = lim
N→∞
νN(b; y(a)) = p(b; y) .
Here the conditional probability p(b/a; z) does not depend on a. Hence
p(a, b; z) = p(a; x) p(b; y), a ∈ Lx, b ∈ Ly.
From the physical viewpoint the notion of independent collectives is more
natural than the notion of independent events in the conventional probability
theory. In latter the relation p(a, b) = p(a)p(b) can hold just occasionally
(as the result of a game with numbers, see [14] or [9], p.53).
3 Kolmorogov’s viewpoint to the GHZ scheme
From the probabilistic viewpoint the GHZ experiment can be described in
the following way ( in the Kolmorogov approach). Let (Ω,F,P) be a Kol-
mogorov probability space which describes hidden variables. For each setting
(φ1, φ2, φ3) of phase shifts we define random variables A(φ1, ω),B(φ2, ω),C(φ3, ω)
corresponding to physical observables A(φ1),B(φ2),C(φ3) (given by measure-
ments for photons 1,2,3 respectively, in the triple (1,2,3)). Quantum formal-
ism predicts that there exist four settings (φi1, φ
i
2, φ
i
3), i = 1, 2, 3, 4 such that
A(φi1, ω)B(φ
i
2, ω)C(φ
i
3, ω) = 1, (6)
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ω ∈ Ω+i ∈ F, P(Ω
+
i ) = 1, i = 1, 2, 3 ; (7)
A(φ41, ω)B(φ
4
2, ω)C(φ
4
3, ω) = −1, (8)
ω ∈ Ω−4 ∈ F, P(Ω
−
4 ) = 1 . (9)
By using algebraic properties (A,B,C = ±1) we obtain that
Σ+ = Ω+1 ∩ Ω
+
2 ∩ Ω
+
3 ⊂ Ω
+
4 = Ω \ Ω
−
4 . (10)
The trivial mathematical considerations in Kolmorogov’s framework im-
ply that by (7)
P(Σ+) = 1 . (11)
On the other hand, by (9) and (10) we have
P(Σ+) = 0. (12)
This is the GHZ paradox. The typical conclusion is that we could not
use the local deterministic description.
From the Kolmorogov viewpoint it seems that all was right in the GHZ
derivation.
4 Von Mises’ viewpoint to the GHZ paradox
Here we could not start with an abstract probability distribution of hidden
parameters. First we have to define a collective which produces this distri-
bution. To introduce a collective, we have to define the label set L of this
collective. It is convenient to use symbol Ω instead of L (to use formulas
of the previous section). However, it is just the same symbol and nothing
more. Here Ω has the following structure: Ω = Λ × Λ1 × Λ2 × Λ3, where
Λ is the set of hidden variables for a quantum system (a triple of photons),
Λj, j = 1, 2, 3, are sets of hidden variables for measurement devices (for A,B
and C, respectively). 4
For each setting φ1, φ2, φ3 of phase shifts, we may consider (in the hid-
den variables framework) a sequence xφ1φ2φ3 = (ω1, ω2, . . . , ωN. . . .), ωj =
(λj, λ
1
j , λ
2
j , λ
3
j ) ∈ Ω, where ωj is the configuration of hidden variables for jth
quantum system pij (a triple of photons) + three measurement devices at the
instants of measurements j = 1, 2, ...
4To simplify considerations, we assume that all sets of hidden variables are finite.
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The first question is the following: Is xφ1φ2φ3 a collective? We have no
experimental reasons to suppose that micro parameters have the property of
the statistical stabilization (as macro parameters). It may be that the prop-
erty of the statistical stabilization on the macro level is just a consequence of
the average over huge ensembles of hidden parameters. Well, suppose that
xφ1φ2φ3 is a collective. Thus the frequency probability distribution
Pφ1φ2φ3(λ = k, λ
1 = s1, λ
2 = s2, λ
3 = s3) =
lim
N→∞
nN (λ = k, λ
1 = s1, λ
2 = s2, λ
3 = s3)
N
is well defined. 5 So, for four different settings (φi1, φ
i
2, φ
i
3) of phase shifts we
have four collectives xi = xφi
1
,φi
2
,φi
3
, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, with probability distributions
Pi ≡ Pxi. By the GHZ scheme we obtain that
Pi(Ω
+
i ) = 1, i = 1, 2, 3, and P4(Ω
+
4 ) = 0. (13)
Of course, by (10) we obtain
P4(Σ
+) = 0. (14)
However, the first three equations in (13) do not imply that
P4(Σ
+) = 1. (15)
Hence there is no paradox. To obtain the paradox, we need to obtain (15).
Thus there must be some special restrictions on collectives (and consequently
probability distributions) which imply (15). One of such restrictions is that
the probability distribution does not depend on the setting (φ1, φ2, φ3) of
phase shifts:
P = Pφ1,φ2,φ3. (16)
However, such an assumption has no physical justification (compare with
[4]-[9]). First of all we have to assume so called ensemble reproducibility
for hidden variable λ (see [7] and [9]): the preparation procedure for quan-
tum systems must precisely reproduce the probability distribution of hidden
5The consideration of hidden variables for measurement apparatuses is quite natural
from the physical viewpoint. In fact, it is the hidden variable representation of Bohr’s
ideas.
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variables in different runs of the experiment (in particular, for different set-
tings φ1, φ2, φ3). Despite of the common opinion that such a reproducibility
is a natural property of quantum systems (preparation procedures), at the
present stage of experimental research it is impossible to test this hypothesis.
Moreover, the hypothesis of reproducibility is a form of the postulate on the
completeness of quantum mechanics. By the hypothesis on reproducibility
we have that quantum state ψ uniquely determines all statistical properties
of the (ideal infinite) ensemble of quantum particles described by ψ.
So by accepting this hypothesis we turn back (at least indirectly) to the
original discussion of Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen and Bohr on the complete-
ness of quantum mechanics. In some sense this is the logical loop, because
one of the main aims of J.Bell and his followers was to transform the EPR
polemic on the completeness of quantum mechanics into polemic on locality
and determinism.
Remark (On the interpretation of a wave function).Of course, all our
previous considerations on the hypothesis of reproducibility and the completeness
of quantum mechanics strongly depend on the interpretation of a wave function.
In fact, we used so called statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics (see, for
example, L. Ballentine [19]): a wave function gives the description of statistical
properties of an ensemble of quantum particles. Here the statistical reproducibility
of macro properties need not be based on the statistical reproducibility of micro
properties. For an adherent of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation (by that
the wave function provides the complete description of an individual quantum
system), there are no doubts in the validity of the hypothesis of reproducibility.
However, even if we suppose that there are no ensemble fluctuations,
there are still some doubts in the validity of (16). It is more natural to think
that different settings of apparatuses produce different distributions of micro
states of these apparatuses (compare with [4]-[9]).
5 Singularity/equivalence dichotomy and the
principle of complementarity
Of course, (16) is only a sufficient condition for obtaining the GHZ paradox.
In fact, we need only that
Pφ1φ2φ3(E) = 0↔ Pφ′1φ′2φ′3(E) = 0 (17)
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for any two settings φ1φ2φ3 and φ
′
1φ
′
2φ
′
3 of measurement devices. This con-
dition is well known in the measure theory, namely this is the condition of
equivalence of two measures: they are absolutely continuous with respect
to each other. The absolute continuity implies that the transition from one
setting of measurement devices to another is sufficiently smooth (in measure-
theoretical sense). There exists so called Radon- Nikodim derivative:
dPφ1φ2φ3
dPφ′
1
φ′
2
φ′
3
(ω) = f(ω;φ1φ2φ3/φ
′
1φ
′
2φ
′
3).
The GHZ paradox (via our frequency analysis) demonstrated that quantum
measurement procedures induce probability distributions which transform
nonsmoothly (in measure-theoretical sense) from one setting to another.
Measure-theoretical singularity is described by the notion of singularity:
P′ ⊥ P′′ if there is a set E ∈ F such that P′′(E) = 1 and P′(E) = 0. Suppose
that Pi ⊥ Pj, i, j = 1, 2, . . . , 4, where Pj are probability distributions in
the GHZ scheme. Let Ω+j , j = 1, 2, 3, play the role of E in the definition
of Pj ⊥ P4 : Pj(Ω
+
j ) = 1 and P4(Ωj) = 0, j = 1, 2, 3. Then P4(Σ
+) =
P4(Ω
+
1 ∩ Ω
+
2 ∩ Ω
+
3 ) = 0. Thus there is no GHZ paradox.
We remark that if the space of hidden variables has infinite dimension,
then, for many classes of probability distributions (in particular, Gaussian),
we have equivalence/singularity dichotomy: either equivalent or singular [15].
It may be that the split of reality into classical and quantum is just the
exhibition of such a dichotomy.
6 ‘Gedanken kollektiven’(counterfactural ar-
guments)
We note that in the frequency approach the GHZ paradox can be obtained via
counterfactural arguments (compare with [2], [20]). These arguments are rep-
resented here via the use of ’gedanken kollektiven’. In fact, the GHZ scheme
is applied to four settings (pi/2, 0, 0), (0, pi/2, 0), (0, 0, pi/2), (pi/2, pi/2, pi/2).
Let us consider a ‘gedanken kollektiv’ corresponding to the simultaneous
imaginary measurement for all angles involved in the GHZ scheme: φ1 =
0, pi/2, φ2 = 0, pi/2, φ3 = 0, pi/2. Such an imaginary measurement would be
described by the hidden variable:
ω˜ = (λ, λ10, λ
1
pi/2, λ
2
0, λ
2
pi/2, λ
3
0, λ
3
pi/2). (18)
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Of course, such a measurement is forbidden by the quantum theory. We rec-
ognize this. However, we continue our frequency analysis trying to find the
origin of the impossibility of such a measurement. We may image that there
are two settings φ1 = 0, pi/2 for the first photon, two settings φ2 = 0, pi/2
for the second photon and two settings φ3 = 0, pi/2 for the third photon in
the triple. At the moment of interaction (imaginary) with photons measure-
ment devices with these settings have hidden parameters included in (18).
If we assume that the sequence of parameters ω˜ corresponding to the se-
quence of imaginary measurements, x = (ω˜j, j = 1, . . . ,∞) is a collective,
then we obtain the frequency probability distribution P = Px which can
be used in the GHZ scheme (and induce the paradox). The origin of the
nonexistence of P (statistical stabilization in x) is that collectives corre-
sponding to incompatible settings of measurement devices are not combin-
able: x1 = (ω˜
1
j ), ω˜
1
j = (λ, λ
1, λ20, λ
3
0), and x2 = (ω˜
2
j ), ω˜
2
j = (λ, λ
1
pi2
, λ2pi2, λ
3
pi2
) or
x1 = (ω˜
1
j ), ω˜
1
j = (λ, λ
1
pi2
, λ20, λ
3
0), and x2 = (ω˜
2
j ), ω˜
2
j = (λ, λ
1
0, λ
2
pi2
, λ3pi2), . . .
Thus our frequency counterfactural analysis demonstrated again that the
origin of the GHZ paradox is the existence of incompatible settings of mea-
surement apparatuses (uncombinable collectives).
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